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BOOK REVIEWS
Garber, Marjorie. Dog Love. 341 pp. (New York: Simon & Schuster,
1996)
What does it mean to love a dog?
Marjorie Garber, Director of the Center for Literary and Cultural Studies
at Harvard, and best known for her cultural studies of bisexuality and
cross-dressing, has mobilised her analytical talents and undertaken an
enormous and illuminating project: a literary and popular investigation of
our relationship to and love for dogs.
Dog Love is an overview of our historical, literary and cultural
preoccupation with dogs: from the history of breeding, to criminal and
rescue dogs; psychoanalysis and dogs (including Freud's dogs) to the
new, popular literary anthropomorphism; Dylan Thomas' The Portrait of
the Dog as a Young Artist to television's Lassie; writers' dogs to
academics' dogs (and their dogs' names); talking dogs to bestiality;
petimony (and pooper scoopers) to DNA cloning; a dog's grief to dog
loss. Yet despite its scope (or perhaps because of it), Garber manages to
open up many important philosophical and ethical issues, suggesting a
range of areas for further theoretical analysis.
Having owned my very first dog (Hilda Doolittle, a kelpie named after
the poet) for two years now, this book celebrated my new-found dog
love, while posing questions I had only recently asked myself: What does
it mean that I fantasise about speaking with my dog? (or more truthfully,
fantasise about becoming-dog?) Is a dog an agent in itself or merely an
extension of its human owner in relation to the law? Who is responsible
for the damage a dog may do? What does the increasing jurisdiction
around dogs and the corresponding fight for dog-rights reflect? Do
puppies have mirror-phases, as Lacan suggests human children do? (I am
sure I caught my dog 'stuck' in the mirror once.) Can a dog contemplate;
can she be a philosopher? (One morning when I refused to get up, I let
Hilda outside to wait for me. From my bedroom window I watched her
sitting exceptionally still in the middle of the garden, her nose up, just
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smelling the air - I imagined - and watching/ listening to the birds. She
remained that way for a good twenty minutes.) Why is it easier
sometimes to love my dog than my lover? Do dogs have souls?
While always contemplative, Dog Love is also a collection of real-life
and fictional-life (dog biography and autobiography) accounts of doghuman relationships, and the emotional, psychological, sometimes sexual
and often financial investments we make in them.
It is unbelievable as the dog who arrived to meet his owner at the subway
station every day for nine years after his owner had died, waiting at the
station until midnight, only to return the next day;
funny as Shady Spring Kennels in Maryland which offers: '...dogpaddling, Frisbee and hiking, a Bark-and-Ride camp bus, a camp spa
with hairdo and pedicure, and bunk photographs for the proud parents to
take home'; dog superstores and dog psychiatrists;
disturbing and politically relevant as the tale of the pit-bull from
notoriously racist Virginia who was in need of rescue from legal
'execution' for being a dangerous dog; and his black owner who believed
he could save him by explaining to the court that: 'All the ladies in the
neighborhood like him. Not just the colored ladies. The white ladies too';
and wise as Virginia Woolf's account of a Robert Browning's dog Flush
after a haircut: 'What am I now? he thought, gazing into the glass. And
the glass replied with the brutal sincerity of glasses, "You are nothing."
He was nobody. Certainly he was no longer a cocker spaniel. But as he
gazed, his ears bald now, and uncurled, seemed to twitch. It was as if the
potent spirits of truth and laughter were whispering in them. To be
nothing-is that not, after all, the most satisfactory state in the whole
world?'
Touching, smart, extensive and difficult to put down, this book should be
read by anybody who loves a dog and certainly by those interested in the
ethical and philosophical nature of dog-human relationships.

75

Emily Ballou

DeGrazia, David, Taking Animals Seriously: Mental Life and Moral
Status, x + 302pp. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996.
Is DeGrazia a sophisticated Singer? This thought arose early in reading
this book and hovered until the end. There is an attempt to build up a
different philosophy of moral respect for animals but when the practical
implications are detailed, it seems that utilitarian currents remain. For
example, in discussing the issue of the justification of zoos for their
entertainment value, DeGrazia says 'Entertainment is simply not a serious
enough benefit to justify such harms [i.e. the harms of confinement,
etc.]'.
This may be a very unfair reading of the book which has many
marvellous features. In defending a coherence model of ethical
justification, DeGrazia puts forward a series of norms which the model
must conform to: argumentative support, global illumination (a coherent
system must hang together and the system must explain how the parts
hang together), simplicity, clarity, plausibility, compatibility (or
coherence) with whatever else we know or reasonably believe. This is an
interesting list reminiscent of Kuhn's attempt to ground a position on the
justification of scientific theories See T.S. Kuhn, 'Objectivity, Value
Judgment and Theory Choice' in The Essential Tension (University of
Chicago Press, Chicago, 1977). DeGrazia goes on to state that
fallibilistic and contextual judgements about these norms constitute a
type of objectivity. This, I think, stretches the meaning of objectivity too
much but one could allow for a high level of consensus on such norms
while denying there is any objectivity here. In support of his coherence
theory, DeGrazia says that 'an incoherent opinion, position, or theory is
not reasonable; it does not make sense' (page 18). This is a problematic
claim. There is equivocation on 'incoherent'. If he means by 'incoherent',
a position which violates his theoretical norms such a position could still
make sense. If he means 'nonsense' by the term 'incoherent' then of
course an incoherent position does not make sense but this is not the
same as saying that the position violates his theoretical norms.
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In addition, DeGrazia defends 'a modified notion of impartiality or
universalizability recognizing feminist and other criticisms of this
notion'. He doesn't handle these criticisms entirely satisfactorily. In
response to writers such as Gilligan who suggest that care may be a
higher value than impartiality at least for some people, DeGrazia says
that he isn't arguing that the care perspective is invalid just that it is
insufficient. There is still a conflict with Gilligan. Her arguments have
not been met. Also in the statement of the universalizability principle
which DeGrazia accepts it is not clear how these criticisms have been
recognized: 'Universalizability and formal justice imply that we should
grant equal moral weight or importance to everyone's (relevantly
similar) interests,unless there is a relevant difference between the beings
in question '. Perhaps if more work is done on the notion of 'relevant
difference' a possible resolution of this debate might emerge.
DeGrazia makes a further move in Chapter 3 arguing that the theoretical
virtues of the coherence model favour equal consideration of animals.
There is careful exploration of what this might mean. Chapters 4 to 6
deal with the mental life of animals as DeGrazia believes this study is
necessary to determine which animals have 'basic moral status' and
whether there are morally significant differences among beings with
moral status. In these chapters he draws on human phenomenology,
research in animal behaviour, functional-evolutionary arguments and
physiological evidence. Human phenomenology is discussed as
DeGrazia believes that we have good reason to think that many animals
have minds whose contents are not wholly dissimilar to the contents of
human minds. He states that human phenomenology sets the agenda for
what kinds of mental states to look for in animals, a human-centred
approach with obvious plausibility. Nevertheless I think that we should
be open to the possibility that there are animal mental states which are
different from human ones which could be a basis for according moral
status.
The appropriateness of using the other three types of evidence is given a
strong defence. For DeGrazia, taking animals seriously requires taking
their minds seriously. So it is necessary to consider the empirical data on
animal minds. An excellent summary of this data follows. It points to the
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following conclusions amongst others: that we can attribute pain and
consciousness generally to most or all vertebrates and probably at least
some invertebrates, e.g. cephalopods; (consciousness is accepted as a
sufficient but not necessary condition for mentation and it is
distinguished from self-consciousness) and we can attribute anxiety,
fear, suffering and pleasure to most or all vertebrates and possibly a few
invertebrates. Most or all vertebrates can think. Some animals have a
sense of time and grizzly bears, Great apes, lesser apes, elephants and
dolphins have self-awareness. After a careful exploration of what it is
that constitutes language, DeGrazia concludes that dolphins and sea lions
can master certain syntactic and semantic rules. Chimpanzees, bonobos
and gorillas have a range of linguistic capacities. He then draws the
general conclusion that 'some apes and cetaceans have used, and many of
their conspecifics can do doubt learn, certain forms of language'.
DeGrazia provides a short but convincing argument for the claim that at
least some animals are moral agents, a quite novel position but one that is
receiving some empirical support.
The principle of equal consideration defended requires that equal moral
weight be given to relevantly similar interests. After surveying standard
forms of value theory for humans, DeGrazia supports a subjectivist
position. He argues that all and only sentient beings have interests (based
on his coherence theory). There is an extended discussion of the possible
harm of death to animals, an issue which is generally not given enough
attention. Although his conclusion is tentative he agrees that 'normal
humans who are not thoroughly miserable and hopeless lose more from
dying than do many animals with moral status (at least from fish through
birds).'
The principle of equal consideration requires that equal moral weight or
importance be given to relevantly similar interests no matter who has
them. Some implications of this principle are: a prima facie duty not to
do harm to sentient beings; and a duty not to kill, disable or confine
sentient animals unnecessarily. Some further practical consequences
include a condemnation of factory farming, fishing, and the practices in
most zoos as ethically indefensible.
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I would like to see more argument on the point that it is only sentient
beings who have interests and deserve moral consideration. It is easy to
say along with DeGrazia that nonsentient animals, species or ecosystems
don't have 'relevantly similar interests' but why then do I feel a moral
repugnance at the devastation currently being visited upon coral reefs or
native forests around the world? Is this simply misplaced?
There are some curious omissions in this book. Ted Benton's Natural
Relations is not mentioned. Nor is the work of Greta Gaard, Lori Gruen
or Linda Birke. There is almost no discussion of animal experimentation
which is very odd given the strong defence of vegetarianism. However
Taking Animal Seriously does contain a wealth of well-worked out
discussion on an impressively wide range of issues in animal ethics. It
would make an excellent text for a course in this area.
Denise
Russell
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BOOK NOTES
Linzey, Andrew, Animal Theology, vii +214pp., Illinois Press, 1995.
Many of the chapters in this book have been in the public domain for a
few years as conference papers, journal articles or lectures but they still
constitute a fresh Christian perspective on animals, confronting the view
often read into Christianity that animals are in the world for human use.
The first part of the book is about establishing Christian principles which
relate to animals. These principles turn out to imply some direct moral
duties. The second half of Animal Theology contains an elaboration of
these principles. Vegetarianism is defended. Animal experimentation,
hunting and genetic engineering are all condemned with arguments
which work well given Linzey's basic assumptions but they don't engage
with the challenges of different views a great deal.
Beck, Alan and Katcher, Aaron, Between Pets and People: The
Importance of Animal Companionship, revised edition, xiii + 316pp.,
Purdu University Press, Indiana, 1996.
Between Pets and People is a report of the research which Beck and
Katcher conducted on human-pet interactions. They used techniques
developed by ethologists to study animals in the wild to observe people
and pets in parks, homes and clinic waiting rooms. They also used
physiological measurement, e.g. of blood pressure and some
epidemiology of health and disease. The main research was done prior to
1983 when the first edition came out. There have been some new
additions. The book is not very technical. In fact the style is
conversational. Some accounts are fascinating but many readers will
wish for more depth.
Bavidge, Michael and Ground, Ian, Can we understand animal minds?
vii + 176pp., Bristol Classical Press, London, 1994.
'Mind' here is taken to refer to 'that range of capacities, states and
processes which constitute the living experience of a creature' or the
animal's point of view on the world. No mental entity is posited. Debates
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in the animal sciences concerning the subjective experiences of animals
are outlined followed by a quick run-through of various philosophical
theories of mind. There is an attempt to defuse the problem of
anthropomorphism and to tackle the problem of how it is that we can
ascribe psychological concepts to non-language using animals. The
concept of expression is employed. Can we understand animal minds is
a good, fast read. This is also not a 'deep' book but it does present some
fresh insights and neatly cuts off many dead ends in philosophy of mind.
Groves, Julian McAllister, Hearts and Minds: The controversy over
laboratory animals viii + 230pp., Temple University Press, Philadelphia,
1997.
Groves is not offering a new moral theory from which we can draw
conclusions concerning ethics and animal experimentation. His aim is to
describe how certain people feel about such research and their reflections
on these feelings. The people in the study are from a 'mid-size college
town' in the United States. They are animal rights activists and animal
research supporters. It is probably fair to say the sample is representative
of activists and research supporters in other Western countries. Hearts
and Minds does highlight the complexity of attitudes and feelings on
both sides of this divide. Yet Groves thinks that the two groups are not
as different as they have been made out to be with regards to their
feelings about animals.
The final chapter contains a discussion of the problems with federal and
institutional guidelines for laboratory animal welfare. This is certainly an
area which needs much more consideration along with the broader
questions concerning regulation of animal research and promotion of
alternatives. The existence of institutional guidelines and ethics
committees often leads to unwarranted complacency.
.
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Announcements
The Encyclopedia of Animal Rights and Animal Welfare will be
published by Greenwood Press and it is tentatively scheduled for release
in early 1998. Edited by Marc Bekoff of the University of Colorado this
one volume reference work will provide essays from recognized
authorities in the field addressing the many issues of animal rights and
animal welfare. The forward is written by Jane Goodall. For more
information contact Marc Bekoff, EPO Biology, University of Colorado,
Boulder,
Colorado,
80309-0334,
U.S.A.
email:
marc.bekoff@colorado.edu

